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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2312
___________
IN RE: MICHAEL RINALDI,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Related to Crim. No. 3:98-cr-00294-002)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
May 23, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Michael Rinaldi, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, has filed in this Court a
pleading titled “Writ of Error,” which has been docketed as a petition for a writ of
mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651. In this petition, Rinaldi asks this Court to direct the
District Court to dismiss the indictment against him.
In 1999, Rinaldi was convicted of various drug trafficking and firearms charges
and sentenced to 248 months’ incarceration. We affirmed Rinaldi’s judgment on direct

appeal. See United States v. Rinaldi, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000). Rinaldi then
unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In June 2012, Rinaldi filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the
indictment was defective because the Government had failed to allege a nexus to
interstate commerce for his drug trafficking offenses. As relief, he asked the District
Court to reverse and vacate his conviction. The District Court denied his motion,
explaining (i) that Rinaldi should be proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after obtaining
authorization from this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and (ii) that his
motion to dismiss was untimely filed. We declined to issue a certificate of appealability
and summarily affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. See United States v. Rinaldi,
No. 12-2938 (order entered Dec. 28, 2012). On May 8, 2013, Rinaldi filed the instant
petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking to have this Court direct the District Court to
dismiss the indictment in his case because of the Government’s failure to allege the
interstate commerce nexus.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted only in extraordinary cases. In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). To demonstrate that
mandamus is appropriate, a petitioner must demonstrate that “(1) no other adequate
means exist to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is
clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
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Rinaldi has not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ,
as he is not asking us “to confine the [District Court] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d at 378 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Here, he is attempting to appeal for a second time the District Court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss the indictment, which he cannot do through a mandamus petition. See
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (mandamus is not a substitute for
appeal). Instead, he could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review our December 28, 2012 order denying him relief.1
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
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In any event, it is well settled, and Congress has explicitly noted, that drug trafficking
activities affect interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (“[i]ncidents of the traffic
which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect on interstate
commerce”). Moreover, federal drug trafficking statutes are valid exercises of Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105, 107
(3d Cir. 1996). Finally, to the extent that Rinaldi asserts that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction because of the alleged defects in the indictment, that argument was rejected
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
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